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Abstract: This study aims to establish a model of traditional retailers’ horizontal merger based on the dual-channel
supply chain of product differentiation, and analyze the decision of merger. The study shows that if the profit is bigger
after merging, the threshold of synergy from lower to higher level is traditional retailers, social welfare, manufacturer
and consumer surplus. When the synergy reaches a certain positive threshold, the merger will help to ease the channel
conflict and benefit all parties. The increase in the degree of product differentiation between traditional channels and the
growth in the market share of electronic channels are beneficial for manufacturers, consumers and social welfare to make
a profit from the merger. On the contrary condition, it will benefit the traditional retailers.
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D0 = H   P0 + P1 + P2;
D1 = K   P1 + P0 + P2;
























Ri = (Pi   w   c)Di; i = 1; 2:
制造商总利润和其直销电子渠道部分的利润函数为

















价策略((w,P 0 ),P 1 ,P 2 )为8>><>>:
w =








P 1 = P

2 =
(3  2   22)K + f2H + f0c
2f0f2
: (2)






















































































其中: f3 = K   (1  )c, f4 = 7  4,根据假设可知
f1、f2和f4均大于0.
由于应满足0 < w < P 1 , 0 < w < p2,D0 >
0,D1 > 0,D2 > 0,同时为了避免R1、R2直接从电子
渠道采购,导致渠道混乱,应确保w < P 0 ,则需满
足约束条件
 <












1   wM   cM )DM1 +





















DMi (Pmax   PMi ); i = 0; 1; 2;





略((wM; PM0 ); (PM1 ; PM2 ))为8>><>>:
wM =
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造商电子渠道利润、消费者剩余及社会总福利为
DM0 =








































































































































M   M =
f21 f2c





M(E)   M(E) =
(f1H + 2K)(f3   f1f2c)
4f0f1f2
; (26)









2 f3c  (4  )f23
16f1f22
; (27)

















1)当c > 0时,wM > w,否则wM < w;














1)当c 6 u(1)时,PM1 > P 1 ,PM2 > P 2 ;否则
PM1 < P

1 ,PM2 < P 2 .
2)当c 6 u(1)时,DM0 > D0 ;否则DM0 < D0 .
3)当c > u(1)时,DM1 > D1 ,DM2 > D2 ;否则
DM1 < D

1 ,DM2 < D2 .
4)当c 6 u(1)时,MM(E) > M(E);否则MM(E)
< M(E).
5)当c > u(1)时, CSM > CS;否则CSM <
CS.
由式 (21) (23)、(26) (27)可以得出推论2.由

















1)当c > u(2)时,MM > M ,否则MM < M ;
2)u(2) < u(1).
由式 (25)可以得出推论3.由推论3可知,存在一




















1)当 c > u(3)时,SWM > SW,否则SWM
< SW;
2)u(3) < u(2) < u(1).
由式 (28)可以得出推论4.由推论4可知,存在一



















2)u(4) < u(3) < u(2) < u(1).
由式 (24)可以得出推论 5.由推论 5可知,令
































f22   2   f2)
f1f2
< 0;
u(4) < u(3) < u(2) < u(1):
表 1 均衡策略下的零售商横向并购效应
c的阈值 (u(4); 0)(0; u(3))(u(3); u(2))(u(2); u(1))(u(1); c)
wM < 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
PM0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0
PM1 =P
M
2 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 < 0
DM0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 < 0
DM1 =D
M
2 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0
MM(E) > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 < 0
MM < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 > 0
MR > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
CSM < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0

















































商发生横向并购,wM、PM0 、PM1 、PM2 、DM1 、
DM2 、MR 、MM、CSM和SWM与的变动无
关,wM、PM0 与 的变动无关.
证明 由式 (20) (28)可以看出,wM、PM0 、










商发生横向并购,给定K、 c、,当c < u(1)时,
DM0 、MM(E)随着的增大而增大,否则随着的
增大而减小.
证明 通过数学计算式 (22)和 (26)可以得出:当










































































第12期 计国君等: 基于产品差异化双渠道供应链的零售商横向并购决策 2207
最后,讨论电子渠道的市场份额对零售商横向并
购效应的影响.为了便于分析,假设市场规模总量为
a, 为电子渠道的市场份额, 1  为传统渠道的市场
份额,则
H + 2K = a;
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4.2 电子渠道市场份额对各阈值的影响








































剩余和社会福利变化的影响,取参数值K = 20,H =
10 (a = 50;  = 0:2), c = 6.为了便于比较不同阈值
水平下,各方利益的变化,分别取 = 0:1、 = 0:2、











































































































































































的利润水平. 4)在图4(d)中,当 = 0:4时,c的阈值
u(1)大于6,不在图形范围内.也就是说,在c的上限
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